People believe that, even in very large samples, proportions of binary signals might depart significantly from the population mean. We model this "non-belief in the Law of Large Numbers" by assuming that a person believes that proportions in any given sample might be determined by a rate different than the true rate. In prediction, a non-believer expects the distribution of signals will have fat tails, more so for larger samples. In inference, a non-believer remains uncertain and influenced by priors even after observing an arbitrarily large sample. We explore implications for beliefs and behavior in a variety of economic settings. (99 words) JEL Classification: B49, D03, D14, D83, G11
Introduction
Psychological research has identified systematic biases in people's beliefs about the relationship between sample proportions and the population from which they are drawn. Following Tversky and Kahneman (1971) , Rabin (2002) and Rabin and Vayanos (2010) model the notion that people believe in "the Law of Small Numbers (LSN)," exaggerating how likely it is that small samples will reflect the underlying population. Yet evidence indicates that people also do not believe in the Law of Large Numbers: they believe that even in very large random samples, proportions might depart significantly from the overall population rate. This paper develops a formal model of such "non-belief in the Law of Large Numbers," which we abbreviate by NBLLN. 1 Our goal is not to explain the source of this bias, or to provide a unifying model of it and other biases, but rather to explore NBLLN's implications and assess its potential importance in economic decision-making.
Even though it is less well-known and has received far less attention than other biases, we argue that NBLLN explains extensive experimental evidence that people infer too little from large-and medium-sized samples. We show that NBLLN has a range of important economic consequences, including causing too little or too much risk-taking, a lack of demand for information, and a persistence of incorrect beliefs despite large amounts of data. In addition, we identify and explore conceptual challenges with modeling NBLLN that are also likely to arise in modeling other biases in statistical reasoning. Kahneman and Tversky (1972) find that subjects seem to think sample proportions reflect a "universal sampling distribution," virtually neglecting sample size. In doing so, subjects vastly exaggerate the probability of unbalanced ratios in large samples. For instance, independent of whether a fair coin is flipped 10, 100, or 1,000 times, the median subject thinks that there is about 1 5 chance of getting between 45% and 55% heads, and about 1 20 chance of between 75% and 85%. These beliefs are close to the right probabilities of for the sample size of 10, but wildly miss the mark for the sample size of 1,000, where the sample is almost surely between 45% and 55% heads.
In Section 2, we develop our model of non-belief in the Law of Large Numbers in a simple setting, where a person is trying to predict the distribution of-or make an inference from-a fixed sample size. Throughout, we refer to our modeled non-believer in the Law of Large Numbers as Barney, and compare his beliefs and behavior to a purely Bayesian information processor, Tommy. 2 Formally, our model assumes that Tommy knows that the likelihood of different sample distributions of an i.i.d. coin biased θ towards heads will be the "θ-binomial distribution." But Barney believes that large-sample proportions will be distributed according to a "β-binomial distribution," for some β ∈ [0, 1] that itself is drawn from a distribution with mean θ. This model directly implies NBLLN:
whereas Tommy knows that large samples will have proportions of heads very close to θ, Barney feels that the proportions in any given sample, no matter how large, might not be θ. Although the model largely reflects the "universal sample distribution" intuition from Kahneman & Tversky (1972) , it also embeds some sensitivity to sample sizes, consistent with other evidence (e.g., Griffin and Tversky's 1992 Study 1) . 3 Other models would share the basic features of NBLLN that we exploit in this paper; we discuss in Section 6 the merits and drawbacks of our particular formulation.
After defining the model, Section 2 describes some of its basic features for Barney's predictions about the likelihood of different samples that might occur and his inferences from samples that have occurred. For instance, while Barney makes the same predictions as Tommy about sample sizes of 1, his beliefs about sample proportions are a mean-preserving spread of Tommy's for samples of two or more signals. In situations of inference, we show that if Barney applies full Bayesian updating based on his wrong beliefs about the likelihood of different sample realizations, a realistic degree of NBLLN implies under-inference: Barney's expected posterior ratio on different hypotheses is less extreme on average than Tommy's. Importantly, for any proportion of signals-including the limit proportion generated by the true state-Barney fails to become fully confident even after infinite data. Consequently, Barney's priors remain influential even after he has observed a large sample of evidence. In Appendix B, we review and meta-analyze the extensive experimental evidence on inference. Consistent with the general features of our model-and contrary to the widespread impression that overconfidence is the pervasive direction of mistakes in beliefs-this evidence clearly indicates that the typical finding is under-inference, and this under-inference is especially severe in large samples. 4
3 Even though we are not aware of any evidence on people's beliefs regarding sample sizes larger than 1,000, our model imposes-consistent with Kahneman and Tversky's (1972) interpretation-that Barney puts positive probability on sample proportions other than θ even in an infinite sample. We conjecture that people's beliefs regarding much larger samples do indeed follow the same "universal sampling distribution" as for a sample size of 1,000. Nonetheless, we emphasize that even if the literal implications of our model for infinite sample sizes were not true, our large-sample limit results would still have substantial bite for the applications where we invoke them. This is because, as per the frequent reliance on large-sample limit results in econometrics, the Law of Large Numbers typically provides a good approximation for Tommy's beliefs in the finite, moderately-sized samples that are realistic for those applications.
4 Despite this evidence, NBLLN is not a phenomenon that has been widely embraced or emphasized by judgment researchers or behavioral economists. We surmise that this is largely because findings of underinference have been associated with an interpretation called "conservatism" (e.g., Edwards, 1968 )-namely, that people tend not to update their beliefs as strongly as Bayesian updating dictates-that does not mesh comfortably with base-rate neglect and other biases that often imply that people infer more strongly than Bayesian. In our view, summarizing people as overly conservative or not conservative enough is manifestly the wrong way to parse human judgment. By focusing on the concrete biases at play and highlighting the co-existence of NBLLN with other biases, we hope to make clear that there is no contradiction.
In the remainder of the paper, we draw out some of the consequences of NBLLN in a wide range of applications that cover many of the major areas in the economics of uncertainty, such as valuation of risky prospects, information acquisition, and optimal stopping. The applications highlight which features of the economic environment determine in which direction (e.g., more risk averse or less) Barney is biased relative to Tommy. Two themes run through these analyses and tie them together: Barney believes that anything can happen, and he under-infers from large samples.
Section 3 illustrates some of the economic implications of Barney's mistaken beliefs about the likelihood of different samples. For example, Barney believes that the risk associated with a large number of independent gambles is greater than it actually is. This magnifies aversion to repeated risks, whether that risk aversion is due to diminishing marginal utility of wealth or (more relevantly) reference-dependent risk attitudes. Because he does not realize that the chance of aggregate losses becomes negligible, Barney may refuse to accept even infinite repetitions of a small, better-than-fair gamble. This refusal must come from a plausible model of risk preferences, such as loss aversion, generating the intrinsic aversion to small risks. But even such an improvement in assumptions about risk attitudes would not generate the observed behavior if a person believed in LLN. Benartzi and Thaler (1999) , in fact, demonstrate clearly the role of both loss aversion and what we are calling NBLLN. However, in other contexts, where payoffs depend on extreme outcomes, Barney's mistaken sampling beliefs could instead make him appear less risk averse than Tommy, such as playing a lottery in which whether he wins a prize depends on correctly guessing all of several numbers that will be randomly drawn.
Both Sections 2 and 3 analyze a model of NBLLN when there is a single, "given" sample that Barney will observe. Yet information does not always arrive in a single package of signals. A person may hear a series of individual reports from random strangers at cocktail parties about their car experiences, while also reading large-sample statistics of car performance. If Barney pools each of his interlocutors' tales with the statistics from Consumer Reports, his inferences will be very different than if he separately updates his beliefs following each cocktail party anecdote, and then treats the Consumer Reports data as one big sample. Such cases confront us with a conceptual challenge intrinsic to the very nature of NBLLN: because Barney under-infers more for larger samples than smaller ones, he will infer differently if he lumps observations together versus separately. A model of NBLLN must involve a theory of how Barney groups information as a function of how it is presented to him and other features of his decision-making environment. With little empirical research to guide us, in Section 4 we discuss and formalize various combinations of assumptions on how Barney "retrospectively groups" signals-how he interprets evidence once he sees it-and "prospectively groups" signals-how he predicts ahead of time he will interpret evidence he might observe in the future. Different combinations of assumptions may be warranted by different perceptual, framing, and decisionmaking environments. Of special interest is the possibility that Barney retrospectively groups signals differently than he prospectively anticipates he will. He may, for instance, plan to separately ask people at cocktail parties about their experiences, and prospectively focus on each conversation as if it is a separate signal; but then in retrospect, he may pool the conversations together as a large sample.
In Section 5, we explore Barney's behavior in various environments involving learning and inference. Although for a given large number of signals Barney will be less certain than Tommy, if Barney and Tommy can both acquire information endogenously, Barney can actually end up being more certain about the state of the world. But because Barney thinks that his inference would be limited even from an infinite sample, he unambiguously has a lower willingness to pay for a large sample of data than Tommy. This lack of demand for statistical data is a central implication of NBLLN and contributes to explaining why people often rely instead on sources of information that provide only a small number of signals, such as anecdotes from strangers, stories from one's immediate social network, and limited personal experience. Indeed, direct real-world evidence of under-inference might be difficult to find precisely because people rarely choose to incur the costs of obtaining a large sample.
A number of conclusions follow from the central fact that, even if Barney does end up observing extensive evidence, he fails to reach appropriately strong confidence. For example, NBLLN acts as an "enabling bias" for distinct psychological biases, such as "vividness bias" and optimism about one's own abilities or preferences, that would otherwise be rendered irrelevant by the Law of Large Numbers. Absent NBLLN, after having processed from Consumer Reports a summary of the experiences of thousands of random strangers, hearing one random stranger recount a vivid story about her car experience-even if the story is overweighted a hundredfold-could not plausibly affect an agent's beliefs. Similarly, absent NBLLN, optimistic priors would give way to more realistic self-assessments after a lifetime of experience.
When agents gather information, variants of NBLLN predict not only that people will never figure out the truth when they rationally should, but that their efforts to learn may be enormously costly. Like Tommy, Barney will plan to quit his costly information acquisition once he reaches some threshold of confidence. And, like Tommy, he may stop gathering signals very quickly if information is decisive. But because Barney tends to infer far less from signals than Tommy, when the initial signals are mixed, Barney may continue trying to learn even after many signals. Indeed, if Barney prospectively anticipates separately updating using each arriving signal but actually pools them retrospectively, Barney may become stuck in a "learning trap": he persistently expects to soon be confident enough to stop experimenting, or buying information, but, because he never achieves the confidence he anticipates, continues his costly efforts forever.
In Section 6, we discuss why we think our model is more compelling than alternative possible explanations and modeling approaches-both fully rational and not fully rational-that might seem to accommodate the psychology evidence. Our model, of course, ignores other important departures from Bayesian inference-such as base-rate neglect and belief in the Law of Small Numbers-that seem separable from NBLLN. But it also omits features-including the psychophysics of diminishing sensitivity, as well as unwillingness to hold or express extreme beliefs-that, as alternative sources of under-inference from large samples, are less separable. In Appendix A, in fact, we present a (complicated) formal model embedding some of these other errors along with NBLLN. Guided by this formal model, in Appendix B we attempt to give a fairly exhaustive review of the empirical work on sampling predictions and inference. We believe this review makes clear that our model of NBLLN is capturing a broad empirical reality. Although in many settings there are alternative reasons why a person may rationally disregard a large amount of evidence-e.g., because the evidence is less relevant given the person's preferences than other, smaller-sample sources of information-our review documents NBLLN only in settings where a Bayesian would fully attend to the evidence.
The Single-Sample Model
Throughout the paper, we study a stylized setting where an agent observes a set of binary signals, each of which takes on a value of either a or b. Given a rate θ ∈ Θ ≡ (0, 1), signals are generated by a binomial (i.i.d.) process where the probability of an a-signal is equal to θ. Signals arrive in clumps of size N . We denote the set of possible ordered sets of signals of size N ∈ {1, 2, ...} by S N ≡ {a, b} N , and we denote an arbitrary clump (of size N ) by s ∈ S N . 5 Let A s denote the total number of a's that occur in the clump s ∈ S N , so that As N is the proportion of a's that occur in a clump of N signals. For a real number x, we will use the standard notations " x " to signify the smallest integer that is weakly greater than or equal to x and " x " to signify the largest integer that is weakly less than or equal to than x. For any random variable y that takes as possible In this section, we develop our model of Barney for the case where he is considering a single clump of N signals. This case corresponds to most of the experimental evidence about NBLLN, which has been collected in settings where subjects were presented with a single, fixed sample of signals or outcomes, in which subjects presumably process all the information together. This special case also allows us to lay bare the essential features of how our model captures NBLLN.
When generalizing the model, complicating conceptual challenges arise. Some of our analysis in fact concerns precisely these complications, but we defer discussion of these issues and ways to handle them until Section 4.
According to the Law of Large Numbers, the mean of a random sample equals the rate with probability 1 in the limit as the sample size gets large: For any interval (
How might we capture the possibility that Barney believes (say, as per an example in Kahneman and Tversky, 1972) that it is reasonably likely that at least 600 of 1000 births at a hospital in a given year are boys, even though he knows that boys are born at a rate of 50%? The essence of our model is to assume that Barney believes samples are generated as if a rate of θ, here 50%, means that the rate is θ on average, but might be higher or lower for any given sample. For a given true rate θ, we model Barney as believing that for the sample he is considering: first, a "subjective rate" β ∈ [0, 1] is drawn from a distribution centered at θ. Then the i.i.d. sample of 1000 babies is generated using rate β. The key implication is that if a given value of β were the actual rate, it would (by the Law of Large Numbers!) exactly determine the proportion of signals in the limit of a very large sample. Therefore, the probability density that Barney assigns to any proportion β of signals (say, 60% of babies are boys) in a large sample is equal to the probability density that Barney assigns to the possibility that β equals that value. Although this modeling approach is "as if" Barney is unsure that the rate is θ, true parameter uncertainty is not at all our interpretation.
Instead, consistent with the underlying NBLLN psychology, we interpret it as Barney's belief that even his certainty that the underlying rate is θ is not a guarantee that the proportion in very large samples will approximate θ. 6 6 In keeping with this interpretation, Barney does not believe the realized β is a real feature of the coin, and is certainly not an object he makes inferences about. Instead, it is a representation of Barney's subjective uncertainty that the θ will manifest itself in a given sample. By comparison, Acemoglu, Chernozukov, and Yildiz (2009) analyze a model that is formally similar to ours but is a model of parameter uncertainty. Similar to our Proposition 2 below, they show that a Bayesian agent fails to learn the state with certainty even after observing an infinite number of signals if he is uncertain about the meaning of signals. In contrast, Formally, we assume that when Barney knows the rate is θ, he believes that signals are generated by a binomial (i.i.d.) process where the probability of an a-signal is equal to β. This β ∈ [0, 1] is called the subjective rate, and it is drawn from a density f ψ ß|Θ (β|θ). We refer to f ψ ß|Θ as Barney's subjective rate distribution and assume that it has the following properties:
A1. For all β and θ, F ψ ß|Θ (β|θ) is absolutely continuous in β, and f ψ ß|Θ (β|θ) has full support on (0, 1) and is point-wise continuous in θ. We will sometimes make the more restrictive assumption:
A2. For all β and θ, F
A3. For all θ and θ > θ,
is increasing in β. Assumptions A3 and A4 are substantive assumptions that do not follow easily from the psychology. Assumption A3 is a monotone likelihood ratio property: fixing any two rates, Barney believes that the likelihood of drawing any particular subjective rate given the high rate relative to the low rate is increasing in the subjective rate. This is a substantive assumption, and it is easy to imagine specifications of f ψ ß|Θ (β|θ)-especially in the spirit of the type of diminishing-sensitivity evidence discussed in Appendix A-that would violate A3. But A3 is in accord with the most directly relevant evidence, namely Griffin and Tversky's (1992) Study 3, which examines a range of parameters of the sort that seems most likely for violating it. 7 It holds for our main example of we assume that Barney has a concrete belief about the meaning of signals, but he thinks that their meaning can vary from one sample to the next. In the dynamic applications we develop below, this interpretation will be much more than an aspiration to get the psychology right but rather an integral part of the formal model. For instance, in situations where Barney must predict further signals after observing his first 100 signals, we assume his expected proportions are still θ, rather than being influenced by the first signals as the parameter-uncertainty interpretation would suggest.
7 In particular, Griffin and Tversky asked subjects to infer the likelihood that a coin is biased θ A = .6 in favor of heads rather than θ B = .25 in favor of heads, depending on different possible outcomes from flipping the coin 12 times. According to the (statistically erroneous) diminishing-sensitivity intuition, extreme samples, such as 10 heads out of 12, seem so unexpected in the case of either rate that they do not provide strong evidence about which rate is generating the flips. Yet consistent with A3, Griffin and Tversky find that subjects' posterior beliefs in favor of the .6-biased coin are monotonically increasing in the number of heads. the beta distribution and more generally is useful for establishing some of our results. Especially because the range of samples for which it is potentially false are inherently very unlikely, we think it is probably not an important caveat to our results. Assumption A4 says that the mean of Barney's subjective rate distribution is the known objective rate. Although we rely on A4 extensively in the analysis, it is in fact violated in existing data. Below we discuss how it is violated, and in Appendix A, we propose a more comprehensive model that captures the psychology that we believe underlies the violations.
When Barney knows the rate is θ, he believes the likelihood of observing a particular clump of
where f S N |ß (s|β) is the (correct) probability of observing s if the rate were β, and this is averaged over the density of subjective rates, f ψ ß|Θ (β|θ). Consequently, Barney's belief that a large sample will have a proportion of a signals in some range [α 1 , α 2 ] is exactly equal to Barney's belief that the subjective rate β is in that range. 8 Lemma 1. Assume A1-A4. Barney does not believe in LLN: for any θ ∈ Θ and interval
Because we assume that Barney's beliefs about the distribution of β puts positive probability density on the entire interval (0, 1), the subjective-rate model captures the essence of our interpretation of NBLLN: Barney believes that the proportion of heads from flipping a coin known to be fair may not be 50% in any given sample, no matter how large.
Since (by the Law of Large Numbers) Barney's belief about the distribution of signals in large samples coincides with his subjective rate distribution, the most appropriate density of β|θ would correspond to the empirical beliefs in studies such as those illustrated in Figure 1 , drawn from Kahneman and Tversky (1972) . The black, gray, and white bars-which correspond to people's reported beliefs regarding samples of size 10, 100, and 1000, respectively-lie on top of each other. This distribution that is common across sample sizes, which presumably corresponds to people's large-sample beliefs about sample proportions, could be directly assumed to be the density of β|θ.
Although Assumptions A1 and A2 are consistent with Figure 1 , A4 is not. Beliefs for θ = .5, Kahneman and Tversky (1972) depicted in the left panel, naturally have mean approximately equal to .5. However, beliefs for θ = .8, depicted in the right panel, have mean approximately equal to .6. The mean of the distribution of signals is displaced toward .5 apparently because the long tail of the distribution is fat. As we discuss in Appendices A and B, we believe that the fatness of the tail is in turn due to flatness of the tail. We attribute the flatness to a psychological bias-"sampling-distribution-tails diminishing sensitivity (SDTDS)"-in which people perceive very unlikely outcomes as similar to each other and hence similar in probability. Because flat tails are omitted from the model, it will not match some features of the empirical evidence, especially when the agent observes an extreme sample. We nonetheless justify A4 on two grounds: analytical convenience, and our contention that the violation of the assumption is best understood as a distinct psychological bias modeled in Appendix A. 9
A subjective sampling distribution specifies an agent's belief about the likelihood of each possible combination of signals when the rate θ is known. Whereas Lemma 1 shows that Barney's subjective sampling distribution (for the number of a-signals) in the large-sample limit equals his "subjective rate distribution," Proposition 1 shows that NBLLN also has implications for Barney's finite-sample subjective sampling distributions. Proposition 1. Assume A1-A4. For any θ ∈ Θ and N ∈ {1, 2, ...}:
9 Analogously, we justify omitting the Law of Small Numbers (LSN) from the model for analytical convenience, and our contention that it is a distinct bias. However, our grounds for not incorporating LSN into the model are stronger because LSN will matter most when NBLLN will matter least-when the observed sample is small-whereas sampling-distribution-tails diminishing sensitivity is, like NBLLN, an especially extreme bias when the observed sample is large.
As N |θ with strict inequality for N > 1.
Part 1 states that Barney, like Tommy, expects the average proportion of a's in the sample to be θ. An immediate and important corollary of Part 1 is that Barney's beliefs coincide with Tommy's when N = 1. Part 2 states that Barney has a riskier subjective sampling distribution than Tommy.
Combined with the fact that the mean of Barney's subjective sampling distribution is the same as Tommy's, this implies that Barney's subjective sampling distribution is a mean-preserving spread of Tommy's. This naturally implies that the variance of Barney's subjective sampling distribution is larger than Tommy's. Part 3 states that the variance of Barney's subjective sampling distribution (for the sample proportion) is strictly decreasing in N . Part 4 states that a higher true rate generates a rightward shift in Barney's entire subjective sampling distribution in the sense of firstorder stochastic dominance.
We now turn to inference problems, where an agent with prior beliefs must infer from observed signals what the underlying rate is; e.g., determining the likelihood that a coin is head-biased rather than tail-biased, after observing a sample of coin flips. Let Θ ⊆ (0, 1) denote the set of rates that have positive prior probability. For simplicity, we assume Θ is a finite set. Without loss of generality, we consider the agent's beliefs about the relative likelihood of two of the rates θ A > θ B ,
We maintain the standard assumption that an agent draws inferences by applying Bayes' Rule to his subjective sampling distributions. We do so both to highlight the role played per se by NBLLN, and because (as we discuss in Appendix B) our reading of the experimental evidence is that except for the well-established phenomenon of "base-rate neglect" (i.e., underweighting of priors), people's inferences are actually well-approximated by Bayes' Rule applied to their subjective sampling distributions. 10 Consequently, Barney's beliefs after observing a particular clump s ∈ S N are f
. Because Barney updates Bayesianly given his model of the data-generating process, his subjective beliefs satisfy the "Law of Iterated Expectations": Barney expects that for any sample size, the mean of his posterior beliefs will equal the mean of his prior beliefs: for any
Due to the LLN, after observing a sufficiently large number of signals, Tommy will be arbitrarily close to knowing the true rate with certainty. In contrast, the central implication for inference of Barney's NBLLN-which plays a large role in many of the applications later in this paper-is that Barney remains uncertain even after observing an infinite number of signals. To boot:
Proposition 2. Assume A1-A4 . Let θ ∈ Θ be the true rate. Then for any θ A , θ B ∈ Θ and prior f Θ (θ A ) = 1 − f Θ (θ B ) ∈ (0, 1) Barney draws limited inference even from an infinite sample:
as N → ∞, Barney's posterior ratio converges almost surely (with respect to the true probability distribution over events) to a positive, finite number:
.
Because Barney's asymptotic sampling distribution coincides with the subjective-rate distribution, his limit inference depends on the relative heights that the pdfs of the subjective-rate distributions for θ A and θ B assign to the proportion θ of a's. Since the subjective-rate distributions put positive density on every proportion in (0, 1), Barney's likelihood ratio will be finite. An immediate and important implication is that Barney's priors-i.e., his ex ante theories about the world-influence his beliefs even in the limit of an infinite sample.
Tommy not only will learn the true rate for sure after observing a sufficiently large number of signals, he also correctly anticipates that a sufficiently large number of signals will make him certain of the true rate. In contrast, Barney mistakenly thinks that his posterior probability of rate θ A after observing an infinite number of signals is a stochastic function of the true rate. The reason is that, even though Barney knows that his inferences in a large sample will be pinned down by the proportion of a's, he incorrectly thinks the proportion of a's is determined by the subjective rate, which could be any number between 0 and 1.
Before having observed any data, Tommy believes: if the rate is θ A , then his limit posterior probability that the rate is θ A is 1. In contrast, before having observed any data, Barney believes: if the rate is θ A , then his limit posterior probability that the rate is θ A is a random variable that has positive density on a nondegenerate interval in [0, 1]. If we strengthen assumption A1 to A1 , then, in addition, the interval is closed and is a strict subset of [0, 1].
We next turn to inference in finite samples. Because Barney's subjective sampling distribution is correct when the sample size is 1, he will draw correct inferences in that case. In many of the inference experiments reviewed in Appendix B and in many of our applications involving inference, the two rates are "symmetric" in the sense that θ A = 1 − θ B , e.g., an urn might have either 60% red balls or 40% red balls. In that case, when exactly half the signals are a-signals, the sample is uninformative for both Barney and Tommy, and neither updates his beliefs about the rate.
For further analysis of the finite-sample case-as well as for some theoretical applications and empirical analysis-it is useful to have a parametric model of Barney's subjective rate distribution.
For some of our results, we impose the functional form of the beta distribution: since the beta distribution is the conjugate prior for the binomial distribution, standard results from probability theory can be used to characterize Barney's beliefs. 12 "Parameterized-Barney" is more biased for smaller ψ-with more dispersed subjective sampling distributions in the sense of SOSD-and Barney coincides with Tommy in the parameter limit ψ → ∞.
Although we do not conduct a careful structural estimation, using evidence from studies that elicit subjects' subjective sampling distribution as well as inference studies, we estimate that ψ falls within a range of 7-15. This parameterized model of Barney gives a sense of magnitudes for how Barney's under-inference depends on the rates θ A and θ B . Suppose ψ = 10, Barney begins with
11
The more common way of writing this beta density is f
Our formulation is equivalent, except it allows for non-integer values of ψ. Recall that the Gamma Function, Γ (x), is the standard generalization of the factorial function: it has the properties that Γ (x + 1) = xΓ (x) and Γ (1) = 1, so that for any positive integer x, Γ (x) = (x − 1)!.
12 The functional form (3) has a few implications about asymmetric inference (i.e., inference problems where θA = 1 − θ B ) that do not have general intuitions related to NBLLN. These are presented in Lemma β4 in Appendix C. Since these properties would not generalize to other models that are equally consistent with existing evidence, we avoid stating implications that rely on these properties of the functional form. equal priors on the two states, and the true rate is θ A . If the difference between the rates is relatively large-with θ A = 1 − θ B = .8-then the role of NBLLN is relatively small. In an infinite sample, Barney's subjective posterior probability of rate θ A will converge to .9998. However, if the two rates are closer together-with θ A = 1 − θ B = .6-then in an infinite sample, Barney's subjective posterior probability of rate θ A will converge to only .69 (which is what Tommy's posterior would be after only 6 heads and 4 tails!). As a reminder about the role of priors, this means if Barney initially had beliefs more extreme than 2.25:1 in favor of rate θ B , he will, in an infinite sample, surely end up believing rate θ B is more likely, even when θ A is the true rate.
While most dramatic in large samples, NBLLN has implications for all sample sizes larger than 1. Since Barney's subjective sampling distribution is too dispersed when N > 1, Barney will "generally" under-infer when the sample size is larger than 1. In order to make that claim precise, we measure Barney's (and Tommy's) "change in beliefs" by the absolute difference between his posterior probability that θ A is the true rate and his prior probability:
Unlike in large samples, in small samples it is no longer universally true that Barney under-infers relative to Tommy. For particular realizations Barney can over-infer or under-infer relative to Tommy-or even infer in the opposite direction, so that a sample that causes Tommy to think rate θ A is more likely, causes Barney to think rate θ B is more likely! 13 Nonetheless, we believe that Barney under-infers in expectation, taken with respect to the true sampling distribution.
Proposition 5 proves this statement for the case of ψ sufficiently small, but we conjecture that it holds for any 0 < ψ < ∞. 14 Proposition 5. Assume Barney has the beta-distribution functional form given by equation (3). Intuitively, on average Barney under-infers because he partially attributes the information in the 13 For example, using the parameterized model, set ψ = 10, θ A = .7, and θ B = .6, and assume equal priors on the two states. Then if the realizations of 80 signals are 53 a-signals and 27 b-signals, then Tommy believes that state A is more likely, while Barney believes state B is more likely.
14 We have simulated Barney's and Tommy's expected change in beliefs for a range of parameter values: for each of ψ ∈ {1, 2, ..., 30} and N ∈ {5, 10, 15, 20}, we examined each of θA, θB ∈ {.5, .6, .7, .8, .9}. We also ran a number of simulations for θA = .99 and .999 and for ψ = 100. In every case we examined, Barney's expected change in beliefs was smaller than Tommy's. realized sample to the subjective rate, rather than extracting all of the information about the true rate.
In symmetric inference problems (i.e., θ A = 1 − θ B ), Proposition 5 shows that stronger comparisons can be made between Barney and Tommy: as long as the realized sample is informative, parameterized-Barney will under-infer, not just in expectation. Proposition 5 also notes a key feature of Barney's updating that shows how it leads to a bias toward "proportional thinking" in inference along the lines suggested by researchers such as Griffin and Tversky (1992) . Consider samples where the difference between the number of a-signals and the number of b-signals is the same, e.g., aa and abababaa. Tommy will draw the same inference from the two samples. But because his asymptotic sampling distributions depend on the proportion of a and b signals rather than their number, Barney infers less from the larger sample.
Prediction Applications
This section explores the implications of NBLLN for behavior that depends on an agent's subjective sampling distribution. In these applications, a key feature of the model is Barney's overestimation of the likelihood of extreme sample proportions. While in some settings (such as the investment context we discuss below), there are non-NBLLN reasons why people might perceive distributions to have "fat tails," we emphasize that Barney believes that extreme outcomes are likely even for known and familiar i.i.d. random processes, such as coin flips. Moreover, NBLLN has the particular property that Barney's beliefs become more distorted as the sample size increases, and this property also plays a central role in the applications.
Perceived Aggregate Risk
An economics professor at MIT once told his colleague Paul Samuelson that, whereas he would reject a bet for even odds to gain $200 or lose $100, he would accept 100 repetitions of that bet. Even though such behavior sounds reasonable to most of us, Samuelson (1963) reports the conversation so as to prove that it violates classical expected-utility theory. That is, a Tommy with classical expected-utility preferences (defined over final wealth) who does not exhibit unrealistically large wealth effects should be willing to take a single bet if and only if he is willing to take N ≥ 1 independent plays of that bet. Intuitively, in the absence of wealth effects, preferring K + 1 bets to K bets is the same thing as preferring 1 bet on top of any realization of the K bets. By induction, preferring to take any positive number of the bets is the same as preferring to take one bet.
Yet, it is not just the "switching" that violates classical expected utility preferences, but the aversion to the single bet to begin with. Rabin (2000a Rabin ( , 2000b and Rabin and Thaler (2001) have followed others in noting that the degree of concavity required for classical expected-utility preferences, defined over wealth, to explain risk-averse behavior over the small stakes involved in a single play of the gamble is calibrationally implausible. Loss aversion-the tendency to feel a loss more intensely than an equal-sized gain-explains why the majority of people who turn down the one-shot gamble do so. 15 A Tommy with a simple, piecewise-linear loss-averse utility function
where w 0 is initial wealth and z is a monetary gain or loss, will refuse the one-shot bet as long as the coefficient of loss aversion, λ-often set equal to 2.25 (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman, 1991) -is greater than 2. 16 However, a Tommy with typical loss-averse preferences would be extremely happy to accept 100 repetitions of the same gamble: while the expected gain is $5,000, the chance of a net loss is only 1/700, and the chance of losing more than $1,000 is only 1/26,000.
Despite being loss averse enough to turn down the one bet, nobody with fully rational beliefs would turn down 100 repetitions of this bet. Yet, unlike Samuelson's colleague, many people would do so! In hypothetical questions from one study in Benartzi and Thaler (1999) , for instance, 36%
of participants said they would turn down a single scaled-down Samuelson type bet (win $100 or lose $50), but fully 25% also reject the 100-times repeated gamble. 17 NBLLN helps explain why many people turn down these gambles. 18 Barney exaggerates the 15 Samuelson himself had speculated that it was the willingness to accept repeated plays of the bet that was the mistake, rather than the refusal to accept a single gamble. Samuelson's conjecture that his colleague's willingness to accept the repeated gamble was the result of a "fallacy of large numbers"-a mistaken belief that the riskiness of the gamble evaporates with a sufficiently large number of repetitions-is the opposite of NBLLN, and is contradicted by Benartzi and Thaler's (1999) evidence, reported below, that people exaggerate the probability of a loss in the repeated bet.
16 Although essentially correct for small gambles, assuming linear consumption utility can become problematic if bets are repeated so many times as to involve large amounts of wealth. However, if in our limit results below, we halve the stakes every time we double the number of repetitions, the linearity assumption is unobjectionable.
17 In two other subject pools, they find 34% and 23% turn down a simple $20/$10 gamble, and more people-57% and 50%-turn down the repeated gamble. Keren (1991) finds similar results in incentivized single bets vs five-times-repeated bets; for related hypothetical evidence, see Keren and Wagenaar (1987) and Redelmeier and Tversky (1992) . Klos, Weber and Weber (2005) replicate and extend Benartzi and Thaler's findings. They present subjects with four lotteries, each of which may be played singly, repeated 5 times, or repeated 50 times. Subjects generally prefer the repeated gambles but vastly overestimate the probability of loss as well as the expected loss conditional on losing money. Klos, Weber and Weber also find that subjects incorrectly believe the probability of the monetary outcome ending up within a given interval around the expected value increases with the number of repetitions. This last finding is inconsistent with our model of NBLLN and may reflect a bias from focusing subjects' attention on the expected value, or it may be consistent with "exact representativeness," a bias we discuss in Appendix B.
18 Our emphasis on how NBLLN helps explain why loss-averse people turn down the repeated bet is because of its calibrational relevance, but it is worth noting that NBLLN also has implications for how expected-probability that the repeated bet will turn out badly. Indeed, Benartzi and Thaler report evidence consistent with this explanation: when asked the probability of losing money after 150 repetitions of a 90%/10% bet to gain $0.10/lose $0.50, 81% of subjects overestimated the probability-and by an enormous margin. While the correct answer is .003, the average estimate was .24. To show that subjects' mistaken beliefs were driving their choices, Benartzi and Thaler compared subjects' willingness to accept the repeated bet with their willingness to accept a single-play bet that had the histogram of money outcomes implied by the repeated bet. While only 49% of the college-student subjects accepted 150 repetitions of the bet, 90% accepted the equivalent singleplay bet, suggesting that the repeated bet would have been very attractive if subjects had correctly understood the distribution of outcomes. 19, 20 Formally, while a loss-averse Tommy will always accept a better-than-fair bet if it is repeated enough times, a loss-averse Barney may-depending on how favorable the bet is and how loss-averse he is-turn down an infinitely-repeated bet.
Proposition 6. Assume A1-A4. Suppose Barney and Tommy have simple, piecewise-linear lossaverse preferences as specified in (4). Fix any gamble (θ, h, t), paying off h > 0 with probability θ and −t with probability 1 − θ, that is better than fair: θh > (1 − θ) t. For any λ ≥ 1, there is some N ≥ 1 such that if N > N , then Tommy will accept N repetitions of the gamble. In contrast, for Barney there is some threshold level of loss aversion λ > 1 such that: if λ < λ, then there is some N sufficiently large such that Barney will accept N repetitions of the gamble for all N > N ; and if λ ≥ λ, then there is some N sufficiently large such that Barney will reject N repetitions of the gamble for all N > N .
Moreover, it is possible for Barney to exhibit the opposite pattern from Samuelson's colleague, accepting the single bet but rejecting the 100-times repeated bet! Consistent with this possibility, the evidence cited above from Benartzi and Thaler (1999) found behavior in the opposite direction utility-over-wealth agents respond to repetitions of bets. We can extend the "if" part of Samuelson's theorem: if Barney rejects a bet at all initial wealth levels w 0 , then he would also reject any N ≥ 1 independent plays of that bet. The "only if" direction does not extend, and a Barney who is just indifferent between accepting and rejecting a simple bet would, because he exaggerates the risk, strictly prefer to reject repeated versions of the gamble.
19 Note also that something more than the type of "narrow bracketing" stressed by authors such as Tversky and Kahneman (1986) , Kahneman and Lovallo (1993) , Benartzi and Thaler (1995) , Read, Loewenstein and Rabin (1999) , Barberis, Huang and Thaler (2006) , and Rabin and Weizsäcker (2009) seems to be playing a role. Those papers emphasize that people often react to a combination of risky bets as if they were deciding about each risky bet in isolation from all the others. While such neglect of the effects of aggregating risks may help explain why people reject the repeated gamble, it seems clear that even people who attend to the aggregate effects misunderstand these aggregate effects. Benartzi and Thaler (1999) make this especially clear by demonstrating directly that people asked the probability of aggregate loss of independent bets exaggerate along the lines predicted by NBLLN. 20 Benartzi and Thaler also elicited the effects of showing the histogram in the above hypothetical examples and showed that it reduces rejections from 25%, 57%, and 50% to, respectively, 14%, 10%, and 17%. of Samuelson's colleague in two out of their three studies. 21
Using the one-parameter functional form for Barney, calibrations suggest that NBLLN goes much of the way, but not all of the way, in explaining why 25-57% of participants turned down the repeated bets in Benartzi and Thaler's studies. For Tommy, the coefficient of loss aversion required to explain this data is absurdly high, in excess of 32,000. For Barney with ψ = 10, the required loss aversion is approximately 15-many orders of magnitude closer to reality but still much larger than reasonable estimates of λ, such as 2.25. 22
In addition to predicting that people perceive too much risk in repeated betting, NBLLN also predicts that people perceive too much risk in the closely-related context of long-term investing.
Indeed, analogously to the evidence on repeated betting, Benartzi and Thaler (1999) found that university employees vastly overestimated the probability that equities would lose money over a thirty-year horizon. Moreover, the employees stated a far greater willingness to invest in equities when they were explicitly shown the thirty-year returns. While there are many reasons why individuals may invest less in equities for retirement than recommended by standard finance models, we suspect that NBLLN is an important contributing factor. As such, just as in other settings researchers may underestimate risk aversion by ignoring overconfidence when inferring risk preferences from investment behavior, researchers might therefore exaggerate the risk aversion of investors by ignoring NBLLN.
NBLLN also helps explain why people fail to fully recognize the benefits of diversification.
Proposition 6 would go through essentially unchanged if the agent were mixing N independent gambles (rather than repeating a gamble N times). Tommy would always accept a portfolio of positive-expected-value gambles if N is sufficiently large. In contrast, if Barney is sufficiently loss averse, then regardless of how large N is, Barney may prefer not to hold this portfolio.
21 Preferences that generate an aversion for multi-stage resolution of risk-such as the preferences proposed by Koszegi and Rabin (2009) or Dillenberger (2010) -could also predict rejections of repeated gambles. The psychology underlying this prediction, however, only seems plausible when the outcomes of each individual gamble are observed separately. In contrast, NBLLN predicts rejection precisely due to mistaken beliefs about the combined outcomes of the gambles. Furthermore, NBLLN predicts risk-seeking behavior in settings where these other models would not, e.g., in the lottery example in the next subsection.
22 Incorporating some of the biases missing from our model of NBLLN (such as the SDTDS bias) that would generate even fatter tails in subjects' subjective sampling distribution helps reduce the required level of loss aversion even more-although still not to 2.25. Indeed, even if an individual exhibited the most extreme form of NBLLN and SDTDS (and possibly also probability weighting), putting equal weight on every possible outcome of the repeated gamble, the required level of loss aversion would be around 4 (because only 1/3 of the outcomes are losses). This exercise implies that some other bias is also implicated in turning down the repeated bet. Whatever it is might also explain why some subjects turn down the aggregate bet even when it is presented in histogram form.
Other Prediction Applications
In the example above, Barney's exaggerated belief about the likelihood of extreme sample proportions causes him to behave in a way that appears risk averse because his payoff depends on the total number of a-signals (i.e., winning outcomes) that occur. In situations where Barney's payoff instead depends on whether an extreme outcome occurs, the same exaggerated belief can lead to behavior that appears risk seeking. For example, suppose Barney is deciding whether to play a lottery game where he picks N numbers, he wins a prize if all his picks match the numbers chosen randomly by the lottery, and the probability that any given number he picks is chosen by the lottery is θ. If N > 1, then Barney believes his chance of matching all the number is higher than it is, and hence his willingness to pay to play this game is higher than Tommy's. The logic of NBLLN implies that the difference from Tommy is larger for larger N .
In contrast, in situations where Barney gets a payoff as long as an extreme outcome does not occur, Barney's behavior can appear to be especially risk averse. Suppose Barney attends a job fair at which he applies to N > 1 equally-valuable jobs, his chance of getting any particular job is θ, and he cannot accept more than one job. Since Barney believes his chance of getting at least one job offer is lower than it is, Barney's willingness to pay to attend the job fair is lower than Tommy's.
Another implication of Barney's distorted predictions is that he does not think that knowing the rate is as useful for predicting signals as it actually is. This can cause Barney's willingness to pay for information to differ from Tommy's (for reasons distinct from Barney's inferences, as explored in Section 5). For example, suppose an agent is making a one-shot decision whether or not to put his savings of $100,000 in a risk-free bond that pays 0% interest or in an illiquid mutual fund for the next N years, but he does not know whether the fund is run by a talented manager (state A) or not (state B). If the manager is talented, then the probability that the fund will increase rather than decrease in value by 10% in any given year is θ A , which is higher than the probability of the good return if the manager is not talented, θ B < θ A . Fix the agent's utility function over final wealth u (w) = √ w, number of years N = 2, Barneyness parameter ψ = 1, prior f Θ (θ A ) = .5, and θ B = .4. In principle, one could imagine Barney's beliefs in a dynamic environment as being either retrospective-acceptive or retrospective-pooling, combined with being either prospective-acceptive or prospective-pooling. We argue that Barney cannot be prospective-pooling, however, in any environment where he expects to make a decision at a future date. More generally, we impose the following constraint on any model of NBLLN: at any date where the agent makes a decision, he processes signals before and after that date as being in separate groups-and before that date, he knows he will do so. We consider this to be a modeling coherence constraint because it ensures that Barney's NBLLN from the single-clump model in Section 2 generalizes to every decision node in a multiple-clump setting.
To see this, suppose Barney knows that θ = .5, reads a summary of 10,000 individuals' experiences in Consumer Reports, and then must make a prediction about the next 1,000 signals he will observe. If, in violation of our modeling constraint, he were to process all 11,000 signals together as a single group after already observing the first 10,000 signals, then he would believe that the same subjective rate β applies to all 11,000 signals. Using the first 10,000 signals, he would update his belief about β from f ψ ß|Θ (β|θ = .5) to a density that puts almost all the probability mass on the observed proportion of a-signals, say 50%. Since the next clump is grouped with the earlier clump, his subjective sampling distribution for the next clump will put negligible weight on a proportion of a-signals outside a neighborhood of 50%. In his predictions about future signals, Barney would no longer exhibit NBLLN. In contrast, our modeling constraint requires that Barney forms beliefs as if a new β is drawn from f Which processing assumptions are the most psychologically plausible? We hypothesize that in many situations, Barney will expect to process data more finely in the future than he actually will do retrospectively. 25 For example, if Barney plans to keep talking to friends one by one until he feels confident, he might think ahead with attention to each separate signal, focusing on how he will update from current beliefs after his next conversation. But then in retrospect, after he has talked to his next friend, he may quite naturally treat that friend's information symmetrically with all the previous conversations and take stock of his current information by thinking together about all the advice he has received. Accordingly, in some of our applications, we explore the implications of Barney being retrospective-pooling and prospective-acceptive.
As an implication of all the other ways he is rational, Tommy always processes information the way that he expects to process information. We call this property processing-consistency. Despite his irrationality, Barney shares this property if his retrospective and prospective thought processes coincide. In particular, if Barney is retrospective-acceptive and prospective-acceptive, then he is processing-consistent and accurately forecasts what his own future beliefs will be after he observes a sequence of signals. In contrast, if Barney is retrospective-pooling and prospective-acceptive-as we have argued is often plausible-then he is not processing-consistent. As a result, he may behave in a time-inconsistent way, e.g., expecting to learn a lot from purchasing a large number of signals, but remaining uncertain after observing the signals and therefore preferring to purchase yet more signals. This time-inconsistency will play a role in some of the applications we study.
Besides lack of evidence, an additional and major reason the hypotheses in this section are tentative is that we have completely sidestepped the issue of when and how Barney might "think through" his beliefs more fully. Even if Barney is not processing-consistent, our model of Barney's beliefs is internally consistent. Barney's beliefs themselves, however, may not be internally consistent, and this raises additional conceptual and practical issues in applying a model of NBLLN. 26 25 We emphasize, however, that we are hypothesizing about what is typical, and we can imagine alternative possibilities in certain situations. For example, Barney might be retrospective-acceptive but pool signals he has not yet observed: before he talks to the 10 friends (say) he plans to talk to, he may not attend to the time separation of the information and not realize that he will update his beliefs story-by-story as he goes along. But retrospectively, he may be retrospective-acceptive, distinguishing colorful details of his friends' stories.
26 The internal inconsistency we highlight here does not arise in "false-model Bayesian" models of biased For example, a teacher could elicit Barney's belief about the likelihood that a first signal will be a, the likelihood that a second signal will be a conditional on the first signal being a, and the likelihood that a sequence of two signals will be aa; then the teacher could point out that the product of the first two does not equal the second. In fact, even our coherence constraint above could fail depending on the questions a teacher asked Barney. For example, suppose Barney expects to observe 10,000 signals from Consumer Reports, then make some payoff-relevant decision, and then observe another 1,000 signals. If a teacher asks Barney to forecast all 11,000 signals, then Barney would presumably do so according to the single-clump model with N = 11, 000-in violation of our modeling constraint. Even in the absence of a "teacher," Barney might ask himself such questions. 27 While we flag these issues, and we think they are natural subjects of future research,
we proceed in subsequent sections with the assumption that Barney does not think through the inconsistencies in his own beliefs.
Inference Applications
This section explores some implications of NBLLN for inference, applying variants of our model to information acquisition, learning, and experimentation. In all of these applications, we adopt a standard framework in which an agent is uncertain about which of two possible states of the world, ω ∈ {A, B}, is true. State A has prior probability 0 < f Θ (θ A ) < 1, and state B has prior probability
In state A, the probability of an a-signal is θ A , and the probability of a b-signal is 1 − θ A . In state B, the probability of an a-signal is θ B < θ A , and the probability of a b-signal is 1 − θ B . Depending on the particular application, the agent can take actions, or observe outcomes and signals that can inform him about the state of the world.
While the applications in Section 3 focused only on the implications of Barney's predictions, beliefs such as Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) , Rabin (2002) , and Rabin and Vayanos (2010) . In these models, biases are formulated as agents holding the wrong theory as to the statistical structure of the world, but as being fully Bayesian in their interpretation of data within that structure. So long as all events that are possible in the true world are also possible in the agents' imagined world, no internal inconsistency can arise. (Though even in these models, it may be very likely that the agent will observe a sequence of signals that he perceives to be very unlikely.) Processing-consistent variants of Barney likewise reduce to a "falsemodel Bayesian" theory. The processing-inconsistent variants of NBLLN, however, assume an intrinsically non-Bayesian thought process. The modeling challenges associated with internally-inconsistent beliefs are not specific to NBLLN and will arise in any model of belief formation that is fundamentally non-Bayesian. 27 Importantly, a decision Barney faces might itself naturally cause Barney to ask himself such questions. For example, imagine Barney is making a decision whose payoff depends on whether the state is A or B. He could purchase one signal, and then decide whether to purchase a second signal, or he could purchase two signals all at once at a discount. When deciding what to do, it seems natural that Barney would ask himself what he would conclude after observing each of the three possible outcomes: he observes 1 signal, 1 signal followed by 1 signal, and 2 signals together. Having explicitly asked himself about these possibilities, it seems odd that Barney would-as assumed if Barney is prospective-acceptive-expect to conclude less from the 2 signals together than the 2 signals individually.
Barney's behavior in the current setting may depend both on his predictions-what signals he expects to observe-and his inferences-what he expects to believe and actually believes after observing the signals. We therefore make use of the assumptions described in Section 4 about how Barney groups signals retrospectively and prospectively.
Lack of Demand for Large Samples
Suppose Barney is trying to decide what make of car to buy, a Volvo or a Lada. 28 The state is ω = A if the Volvo is superior and ω = B if the Lada is superior. Barney is choosing whether to acquire information by asking a friend, which will provide him with a single signal at cost c f > 0, or by purchasing Consumer Reports, which will provide him with the aggregate information from a large number N of signals, at cost c r > c f . Barney is prospective-acceptive: he anticipates that if he purchases Consumer Reports, he will group all the signals together. After observing the information, Barney must take an action µ, either buying the Volvo (µ = µ A ) or the Lada (µ = µ B ).
Barney's payoff is u(µ, ω), which equals 1 if the action matches the state and 0 otherwise.
The comparison between Barney's and Tommy's valuations of an intermediate-sized sample is
ambiguous: even though Barney might expect to infer less on average than Tommy would, Barney also overestimates the probability of an extreme outcome that would allow for stronger inferences.
Therefore, perhaps counterintuitively, if Barney and Tommy can both choose the total number of signals to purchase, Barney can actually end up being more certain about the state of the world.
For a large sample, however, Barney unambiguously has a lower willingness to pay than Tommy does. Tommy correctly anticipates that-due to the Law of Large Numbers-reading Consumer Reports will make him virtually certain about the true state, but Barney expects to remain uncertain (see Proposition 3). Because Barney expects to learn less from Consumer Reports than Tommy does, Barney is more likely to ask the friend.
Proposition 7. Assume A1-A4. Suppose Barney is prospective-acceptive. Fix payoffs u(µ, ω), Barney's lack of demand for statistical data is a central implication of NBLLN. We believe it is consistent with obvious facts: we live in a world in which people are not persuaded by statistical evidence that should be convincing, people do not demand such information, and such information is therefore rarely supplied by the market. Public health announcements are more effective if they feature vivid anecdotes rather than statistics, and the car-purchaser who actually consults Consumer Reports is the exception rather than the rule. In some cases, people may correctly expect large samples not to be very useful because preferences are heterogeneous, e.g., restaurant satisfaction ratings. When preference heterogeneity is less of an issue, however, e.g., the frequency of car battery failure, the lack of demand for statistical data is a major "dog that didn't bark" clue that implicates NBLLN.
The flip side of people's failure to demand large numbers of signals is their willingness to rely instead on sources of information that provide only a small number of signals. Indeed, given the amount of other information people may be able to obtain at relatively low cost, NBLLN helps explain why they nonetheless often instead rely on limited personal experience, stories from one's immediate social network, or anecdotes from strangers.
The lack of demand for large samples generated by NBLLN is especially severe when Barney is initially confident about the state or when each individual signal is relatively uninformative, i.e., θ A is close to θ B . Tommy understands that a sufficiently large number of such signals will nonetheless reveal the state. In contrast, when Barney has a confident prior or when signals are relatively uninformative, Barney may be unwilling to pay any positive cost for even an infinite number of signals! Proposition 8. Assume A1 and A2-A4. Suppose that the agent is deciding whether to buy Consumer Reports at cost c r or not obtain any signals. Furthermore, fix payoffs u(µ, ω) so that knowing the state is valuable: u(µ A , A) > u(µ B , A) and u(µ A , B) < u(µ B , B). For Tommy: for all rates θ A , θ B ∈ Θ such that θ A > θ B and priors f Θ (θ A ) = 1 − f Θ (θ B ) ∈ (0, 1), there exists a threshold c * r > 0 such that if c r < c * r , then as long as the number of signals N in Consumer Reports is sufficiently large, he buys Consumer Reports. In contrast, for prospective-acceptive Barney: (i) for all rates θ A , θ B ∈ Θ such that θ A > θ B , there exist priors f Θ (θ A ) such that for any c r > 0 and any N , he does not buy Consumer Reports; and (ii) for all priors f Θ (θ A ) at which he is not indifferent between µ A and µ B , there exist rates θ A , θ B ∈ Θ, where θ A > θ B , such that for any c r > 0 and any N , he does not buy Consumer Reports.
Unlike Proposition 7, Proposition 8 relies on A1 (not just A1): Barney thinks that he will draw a limited inference no matter how extreme the sample proportions turn out to be. If his priors are extreme enough or the rates are close enough together, then he thinks that the information provided by an infinite number of signals will not affect whether he buys the Volvo or the Lada.
Consequently, his willingness to pay for an infinite number of signals is zero.
On the flipside, even though Barney often under-infers when presented with information, he may nonetheless purchase information even when it will not have any objective value for him. This is because Barney believes that his posterior after observing a large sample is a random variable, and his willingness to pay is positive whenever he thinks he might draw an extreme enough inference to switch his action from what he would do given only his prior. Yet for a large sample, Barney's posterior is in fact deterministic. Hence if Barney's priors are extreme enough, and the cost of information small enough, he may incur the cost of purchasing Consumer Reports even though the information will almost surely not affect his action. In section 5.3 below, we illustrate how such a "learning trap" phenomenon can also occur in a dynamic setting through a different mechanism (namely, Barney's incorrect beliefs about how he will process future signals).
Enabling "Vividness Bias"
Our example of Barney under-inferring from statistics in Consumer Reports is borrowed from Nisbett and Ross (1980) , who used the contrast between pallid statistics and colorful anecdotes to illustrate "vividness bias." According to psychological research on vividness bias, people overweight vivid evidence in reaching their judgments; a random stranger's graphic description of the horrors that ensued when her car broke down while trying to pick up her child from school may weigh more heavily in our judgment of the brand of car she drives than summary statistics based on large samples of data.
However, NBLLN is a confound for evidence that might otherwise be interpreted as vividness bias. Suppose the random stranger's vividly-recounted car experience is grouped separately from dry statistics summarizing the experiences of a large random sample of similar strangers. In that case, the comparative over-use of vivid evidence may not be over-use of that evidence relative to its proper use, but an indication of under-use of the other evidence. Empirical work on vividness bias should attempt to disentangle it from NBLLN. Moreover, even if there is genuine over-use of evidence due to its vividness (and consequent emotional tug), NBLLN is a theoretically necessary "enabling bias" for vividness bias to matter.
Suppose that the story-teller's car experience, due to its vividness, is counted as 30 data points instead of 1. Despite over-use of the anecdote, LLN implies that its impact will be swamped when a person also has access to a large data set. However, since NBLLN causes the person to infer less from the large data set than she would infer from 30 data points, the vivid anecdote is enabled to have the predominant effect.
Sequential Information Acquisition
Imagine that Barney is (still) trying to decide whether to buy a Volvo or a Lada. But rather than polling a group of friends, he asks one at a time which car is better. Conditional on the responses that he receives, he can decide to ask more friends, or to stop and choose a car. Such sequential information acquisition raises some new issues and possibilities to which we now turn.
Formally, each period t = 1, 2, ..., the agent can choose to purchase a single signal at cost c > 0 or take an action µ ∈ {µ A , µ B }. 29 If the agent takes an action, he gets payoff u(µ, ω), which equals 1 if the action matches the state ω and 0 otherwise, and the agent faces no further decisions. If the agent decides to purchase an additional signal, he sees the realization of the signal, and he proceeds to the next period. The agent lives forever and seeks to maximize the expected action payoff minus expected signal-purchase costs; if the agent purchases κ signals and then takes action µ, his utility is u(µ, ω) − κc. We assume no discounting, so that the only reason an agent would stop acquiring information before being absolutely certain is the cost c of obtaining an additional signal.
For Tommy, the characterization of optimal behavior is well-known (e.g., Wald, 1947) . Each time Tommy purchases a signal, he updates his posterior beliefs. His optimal behavior is characterized by two probabilities, ν l and ν h , with 0 < ν l < ν h < 1. If and only if the posterior probability of state A exceeds ν h , he stops and takes action µ A ; if and only if it goes below ν l , he stops and takes action µ B . Tommy continues to purchase signals as long as his posterior beliefs remains between ν l and ν h . But because his posterior ratio is a martingale process, Tommy will eventually feel strongly enough to take an action almost surely. Importantly, as c → 0, ν l → 0 and ν h → 1, and so as information becomes cheaper, the agent requires more extreme beliefs to stop purchasing information.
Because we assume that the signals arrive one at a time and that Barney is prospective-acceptive, Barney expects to group the signals as samples of size 1. Since Barney expects to behave exactly like Tommy, his policy is the same as Tommy's, with the same thresholds ν l and ν h determining when he stops and takes an action. If Barney is retrospective-acceptive, his beliefs and behavior will be identical to Tommy's.
If he is retrospective-pooling, however, Barney's behavior can differ qualitatively from Tommy's.
In this case, the impact of an additional signal on his posterior beliefs is smaller than for Tommy.
Moreover, the marginal impact will approach zero as his sample of observed signals grows. This is because Barney's inference becomes more and more driven by the proportion of a-signals, which is less affected by an additional signal in a larger sample. However, Barney believes that an additional signal will matter, regardless of the sample size he has already observed. As a result, Barney can become stuck in a learning trap, in which he purchases signals forever, but they will never change his confidence in the state of the world enough for him to stop. The first part of Proposition 9
shows that such a learning trap can occur and becomes more likely the more signals he has already observed:
Proposition 9. Assume Barney has the beta-distribution functional form given by equation (3).
Fix payoffs u(µ, ω), rates θ A , θ B ∈ Θ such that θ A > θ B and prior
Suppose Barney is prospective-acceptive and retrospective-pooling.
1. For all p < 1, there existsc > 0 such that for all c ≤c, Barney buys an infinite number of signals with probability p > p. Furthermore, suppose that Barney, before buying any signals, has a positive probability of buying an infinite number of signals. Then for any ε > 0, there exists N ε > 2 such that if Barney buys an additional signal after having already bought N ε signals, the probability of Barney buying a finite number of signals from then on is less than ε.
2. Suppose θ A = 1−θ B . Suppose Barney is willing to buy an additional signal when his posterior probability (of state A) is equal to q, and suppose Barney's posterior is q after observing N signals. If Barney's posterior probability of state A is q after observing N > N signals, then the probability that Barney will buy an infinite number of signals is weakly higher after he has observed the N signals than it was after the N signals.
3. Again, suppose θ A = 1 − θ B and the prior f Θ (θ A ) ≥ .5. For any ε > 0, there exists N > 2 such that if Barney chooses an action after buying at least N signals, then the likelihood ratio of Barney having taken the action that does not match the state to the action that matches the state is less than ε.
If Barney ends up in a learning trap, then his welfare is unboundedly negative. Because a small c tempts him to wait longer, the probability of a learning trap becomes arbitrarily close to 1 as the signal cost c becomes arbitrarily small. 30 30 Although we prove the results of Proposition 9, and of Proposition 10 in the next subsection, using our parameterized model of Barney, we believe the results in both propositions extend to any distribution satisfying A1-A4. Furthermore, if A1 is replaced with A1 , then there exist situations in which Barney will purchase an infinite number of signals (in dynamic information acquisition) or take a sub-optimal action in every period (in experimentation) with probability 1 -unlike in the current propositions, where these possibilities can occur but always with probability
The second part of the proposition states that, for a given c, Barney is more likely to get caught in a learning trap the more signals he has already observed, holding constant his posterior belief.
For example, if the rates θ A and θ B are symmetric, then an equal number of a and b signals does not change Barney's beliefs; hence Barney is more likely to end up purchasing an infinite number of signals after having observed ababab than he was before he observed any signals. 31, 32 This result points to a more general implication of NBLLN that emerges across a range of dynamic applications: it makes a bigger difference to his eventual beliefs for Barney than for Tommy whether he happens to observe strong evidence of the true state early or late in his learning process.
The basic logic of NBLLN implies that Barney finds observing strong, early evidence, such as the group of signals aa, more persuasive that A is the true state than a group such as abababaa, even though these two groups are, objectively, similarly strong signals about the state (indeed, exactly equally strong when 1 − θ A = θ B ). As a result, if Barney observes strong evidence early on, he may stop trying to learn about the state after only a few signals, while if he observes ambiguous data early on, he may continue trying to learn even after many signals.
This insight also relates to the third part of Proposition 9 (which we prove for the case where Barney's prior weakly favors the true state, although we believe it holds more generally). It states that if Barney does eventually stop purchasing signals, then the probability that he chooses the correct action converges to 1 as the number of signals increases. This is not true for Tommy.
Tommy stops when the difference between the number of a-signals and b-signals exits some region, and the probability of observing any given difference is independent of the total number of signals observed. In contrast, Barney stops purchasing signals when the proportion of a-signals exits some region, and as the number of signals increases, this proportion becomes arbitrarily more likely to cross the threshold that favors the true state than to cross the threshold that favors the false state.
Perhaps surprisingly, an outsider observer who observes the agent purchasing a large number of strictly less than 1. That is because, under A1 , Barney's likelihood ratio is bounded away from zero and infinity. Hence Barney could be in a situation where no infinite sequence of signal realizations would affect his action (even though he perpertually believes there exist sequences that would).
31 Furthermore, elaborating on this second part: there exists aN such that for all N >N , if Barney's posterior probability of state A is q after observing N signals, then the probability that Barney will buy an infinite number of signals is strictly higher after he has observed the N signals than after the N signals. 32 We have found several experiments that set up a dynamic information-purchase setting with a payoff structure similar to the model in the text and that compare subjects' behavior with a Bayesian benchmark, which is calculated assuming expected-value maximization. Tversky and Edwards (1966) , Pitz (1968 ), Wendt (1969 , and Hershman and Levine (1970) found that subjects purchased too much information. In contrast, Fried and Peterson (1969) and Pitz and Barrett (1969) found that subjects purchased too little information. Moreover, Pitz and Barrett found that when the already-observed sample size was larger, holding constant the objective strength of evidence, subjects bought fewer additional signals. Also contrary to our model's prediction, Sanders and Ter Linden (1967) Studies 1-3 found that, when the already-observed sample size was larger, subjects stopped acquiring information at a point where the objective evidence was weaker. In Sanders and Ter Linden's experiments, however, the signals arrived at a rate of 2, 5, or 10 signals per second, which is so fast that the nature of the inference task is likely quite different than in other studies. signals (but does not observe the realizations) should be more confident in betting that the agent took the correct action if the agent was Barney rather than Tommy. Tommy would only have purchased a large number of signals if the evidence were ambiguous up until the very end. Barney, in contrast, having observed a large number of signals, only takes an action when the cumulative evidence from many signals is overwhelming.
Experimentation and Learning About Oneself
Rather than purchasing signals about the quality of the car, Barney could instead take them for test drives, perhaps by renting them. Here, instead of an explicit cost, the cost of information acquisition is the cost of waiting to purchase the correct car. If the Volvo is the better car, then Barney is losing out every day he drives the Lada. For the same reasons that retrospective-pooling Barney could get caught in a learning trap in a dynamic information-acquisition setting, in such an experimentation setting he could end up remaining forever uncertain about the state. In our working paper (Benjamin, Rabin, and Raymond, 2012) , we show that Barney could forever take an action that provides a suboptimal flow payoff in the mistaken expectation that the action will eventually provide useful information.
The failure to learn the truth from a great deal of feedback about the outcomes from one's own actions has important ramifications for people's beliefs about themselves. While there are reasons unrelated to NBLLN for why people have optimistic priors about their own abilities and preferences, we believe that NBLLN acts an "enabling bias" that explains how, despite a lifetime of experience with themselves, people remain uncertain about their own type, and optimistic priors do not give way to more realistic self-assessments. For example, NBLLN may explain why people persist in being overoptimistic about their ability on tasks that they regularly engage in. NBLLN may also explain why people remain uncertain regarding their own altruistic preferences-an otherwisepuzzling lack of knowledge that is a crucial ingredient for self-signaling to help explain altruistic behavior.
We formalize these ideas in a simple, two-action experimentation environment. The agent's type is the state of the world, ω ∈ {A, B}, about which the agent is uncertain. In each of an infinite number of periods t = 1, 2..., the agent takes an action µ t ∈ {A, B}. After taking an action, the agent receives either a high payoff, u H (µ t ), or a low payoff, u L (µ t ) ≤ u H (µ t ). The agent receives the payoff u H (µ t ) with probability θ ω ∈ (.5, 1) and u L (µ t ) with probability 1 − θ ω , and hence this outcome serves not only as a payoff but also as a signal about the state. If the agent is of type A, she earns a higher expected payoff from taking action A, while if she is of type B, she earns a higher expected payoff from taking action B; formally,
). The agent discounts the future at rate 0 < δ < 1.
The first part of Proposition 10 examines the case where both actions are informative. As is well known, Tommy learns the true state and eventually takes his best action in every period. For Barney, if he is retrospective-pooling, then-following the logic of Proposition 2-his beliefs will converge to a limit posterior at which he will remain uncertain about the state. Moreover, the stronger his prior in favor of one of the states, the stronger his limit posterior in favor of that state. If Barney's prior is strong enough, then even if it is incorrect, it may drive his actions in every period. This may describe situations where people begin with strong, but possibly incorrect, intuitions about their own abilities or preferences, and these intuitions are never fully corrected by experience.
Proposition 10. Assume Barney has the beta-distribution functional form given by equation (3).
Fix payoff functions u H (µ t ) and u L (µ t ), rates θ A , θ B ∈ Θ such that θ A > θ B and discount factor δ. Suppose Barney is prospective-acceptive and retrospective-pooling.
. Without loss of generality, suppose the state is ω = B. For all priors f Θ (θ A ) = 1 − f Θ (θ B ) ∈ (0, 1), Tommy's belief that the state is B converges to 1 almost surely, and Tommy's action converges to B almost surely. Barney's belief that the state is B converges almost surely to a number in the interval (0, 1), and this limit posterior is increasing in f Θ (θ B ). Moreover, if f Θ (θ B ) is sufficiently small, then there is positive probability that Barney takes action A in every period.
Suppose
if the state is B, then almost surely at some finite T , Tommy will take action B for all periods t ≥ T . For Barney, regardless of the state, there exists 0 < p < 1 such that for any prior f Θ (θ A ) ≥ p, there is positive probability that Barney takes action A in every period. This probability is increasing in f Θ (θ A ) but is always strictly less than 1.
The second part of the proposition considers a special case of the experimentation environment, a one-armed bandit problem that can be used to study learning about one's own self-control. In state A, the agent can successfully exert self-control when faced with temptation, while in state B, the agent cannot resist temptation. In each period, the "risky" action, A, is to expose himself to temptation (e.g., buying potato chips at the supermarket to eat at home). The "safe" (or "commitment") action, B, is to avoid the temptation (e.g., not buying the chips). The risky action has a higher payoff than the safe action in state A but a lower payoff in state B. A special feature of this setting is that if the agent chooses the safe action, thereby avoiding the tempting situation, he does not get any information about his own self-control. This setting is a simplified version of the Planner-Doer model of learning self-control that Ali (2011) analyzes for the case of Tommy. Almost surely at some finite T , a Tommy without self-control will-regardless of his prior-take the safe action for all periods t ≥ T . While it is possible that a Tommy who has self-control will always take the safe action and therefore never learn that he has self-control, the only Tommys who will take the risky action in the long run are Tommys with selfcontrol. Most of us have the intuition that, despite repeatedly exposing themselves to temptation and succumbing to it, people remain perpetually optimistic about their own self-control-and yet this result for Tommy is the other way around!
In contrast, Proposition 10 shows that if Barney begins with a sufficiently strong belief in his own self-control ability, then it is possible that he will continue to take the risky action even in the long run, in the face of overwhelming evidence that he actually lacks self-control. Moreover, the likelihood that this occurs is increasing in his ex ante optimism.
Concluding Remarks
We have explored a range of applications where we think NBLLN matters. Yet for some other applications where NBLLN may matter, different or additional assumptions will be needed to close the model. For example, consider observational learning. Besides learning from his own experience or from gathered information (two situations we focused on in Section 5), an agent could also choose which car to buy by observing which car his neighbors have bought. In the theoretical literature, it is assumed that an infinite sequence of Tommys with common prior beliefs about the state each in turn observes a single signal along with the history of previous actions and then chooses his own action. Each receives a payoff equal to 1 if his action matches the state and 0 otherwise.
Much of this work has emphasized that with probability 1, after some date each agent ignores his private signal, and a "herd" forms, with all agents thereafter choosing the same action (e.g., Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch, 1992) . Although no agent directly observes more than one signal, NBLLN will influence observational learning if agents apply their non-belief to the signals they infer others are getting. In this setting, we think that the most psychologically plausible retrospective signal-processing assumption is that Barney groups all previous agents' actions together and treats his own private signal, which is more vivid, as separate. In addition to such a grouping assumption, formally deriving the implications of NBLLN in this setting requires an extension of the framework introduced in Section 4 to address what Barney's theory is as to how other agents draw inferences.
Our working paper (Benjamin, Rabin, and Raymond, 2012 ) contains a discussion of some possible ways of handling this issue, along with a formal analysis of observational learning. The results parallel those for dynamic information acquisition from Section 5. Intuitively, if Barney groups together previous agents' actions, then NBLLN implies that he will infer less from their actions than he should. Therefore, he will more often rely on his own signal, making it slower for a herd to begin, especially if early evidence is mixed. Moreover, since Barney needs to see more agents following their own signal before ignoring signals than does Tommy, when a herd does occur, it is more likely to be on the correct action. Finally, because Barney's learning is limited even in an infinite sample, a qualitatively different kind of behavior is possible. If agents do not herd quickly enough, they will instead form what we call an "eddy": following some period, every agent chooses the action corresponding to his own signal.
Another strategic setting in which NBLLN can matter a great deal is persuasion. Barney is again uncertain whether to buy a Volvo or a Lada. A Lada saleswoman has observed N signals about which car is better and can choose how to clump these signals when revealing them to Barney. If the saleswoman must reveal all the signals, and if Barney is retrospective-acceptive but unaware of his own NBLLN-and hence does not realize that the clumping of signals will affect his beliefs-then Barney will not draw any inferences about the state from the saleswoman's behavior.
In that case, she can maximally move Barney's beliefs in favor of the Lada by clumping all the pro-Volvo signals together and separating out each pro-Lada signal. For any two distinct rates and any priors, if N is sufficiently large, then the salewoman can make Barney arbitrarily confident that the Lada is superior.
There are conceptualizations of the tendency to under-infer from large samples that differ from that embedded in our model. One interpretation proposed for many cognitive biases is "ecological mismatch": while a person's thought process leads to biased beliefs for i.i.d. processes studied in the laboratory, the same thought process would generate appropriate beliefs for the typical, realworld random processes people encounter. For example, in the case of under-inference, Winkler and Murphy (1973) posit that people may treat independent signals as if they were positively correlated because their real-world experience is with positively correlated signals. Such positive correlation would generate excessively-dispersed subjective sampling distributions and under-inference but not NBLLN (because the Law of Large Numbers still "works" for positively correlated signals under mild regularity conditions; see Hu, Rosalsky, and Volodin, 2008) . Moreover, while ecologicalmismatch arguments often have merit, we think the argument is unappealing in this context because the bias we call NBLLN is evident in examples with which subjects have a great deal of real-world experience, such as coin-flipping. 33 33 We also note that in the case of the Law of Small Numbers, the opposite ecological-mismatch hypothesis Many have proposed conceptualizing under-inference in large samples as one consequence of the "representativeness heuristic," according to which people draw inferences based on the degree of similarity between features of a sample and features of a population from which the sample might have been drawn. Indeed, Kahneman and Tversky (1972) present evidence for what we call NBLLN in precisely this context. Although NBLLN certainly seems consistent with representativeness, it is not clear how the logic of representativeness predicts the prototypical case of under-inference: e.g., an agent who observes 600 heads and 400 tails continues to put non-trivial probability on the coin being fair. Representativeness could explain this kind of observation if it is interpreted as inferences based on proportions, combined with the additional assumptions of reasonably accurate inferences in small samples and insensitivity to sample size, but that combination of assumptions essentially amounts to our model.
A natural alternative modeling approach would be to build a theory of "sample-size neglect," in which, loosely speaking, an agent forms beliefs about a sample of any size as if it were a "mediumsized" sample of, say, size 7. Such a model would imply under-inference for sample sizes larger than 7 and over-inference for sample sizes smaller than 7. This is a common conceptualization and one which we found compelling enough to consider as our first (and more parsimonious) approach. But we have come to the view that NBLLN and LSN are distinct phenomena. LSN is inherently linked to the gambler's fallacy, the incorrect belief that in i.i.d. coin flips, a head becomes less likely than 50% following a streak of heads. Moreover, the gambler's fallacy has as much force in large samples as in small samples. For example, Benjamin, Moore, and Rabin (2012) found that people think that the probability of a head following a streak of 9 heads from a fair coin is only 32%. If NBLLN were (like LSN) linked to beliefs about sequences of random events, then people would have to believe that a long streak of heads makes a subsequent head more likely. 34 Instead, evidence and intuition suggest that NBLLN is not due to any belief people have about the likelihood of particular sequences of random events. Rather, it is due to an erroneous understanding of how the likelihoods of sequences "aggregate up" into sampling distributions.
Indeed, we have come to the view that the most psychologically compelling alternative approach is often proposed: that people ordinarily deal with negatively-autocorrelated signals. Typical real-world processes would have to have a fairly complicated form involving short-run negative autocorrelation and long-run positive autocorrelation to rationalize both the Law of Small Numbers and NBLLN.
34 One could argue that the sample-size neglect theory, when linked to beliefs about sequences of random events, provides a parsimonious account of both the gambler's fallacy and its apparent opposite, the "hot hand fallacy." This is a false parsimony, however, because shoe-horning the gambler's fallacy and the hot hand fallacy into the same psychological mechanism generates counterfactual predictions about when they occur. As noted, the gambler's fallacy occurs even after a long streak of heads, and as far as we are aware, the hot hand fallacy has never been observed for coins. Instead, the hot hand fallacy is usually understood as occurring in situations where an agent believes that the random process alternates between "hot" and "cold" rates.
to modeling NBLLN would attempt to capture people's failure to realize just how many combinations of a and b signals generate proportions close to the population mean. While we know of no attempt to formulate NBLLN along such lines, we believe that such a model would share the main features and predictions of our model.
While the logic of NBLLN unambiguously predicts that people will extract far too little information from large samples, there are strands of literature both within psychology and within economics on "over-confidence" in beliefs. Rather than viewing over-confidence and under-confidence as fundamental biases in themselves, we view both as outcomes to be explained as a function of the information a person is confronted with. Our model of NBLLN highlights a feature of the decisionmaking environment-namely, sample size-that affects the degree to which an agent will draw too weak an inference from evidence. In Appendix A we combine NBLLN with LSN, which generates a bias toward over-confidence in inferences, and the overall pattern we predict is: approximately correct inference for samples of size 1, over-inference in small samples larger than 1, and underinference in large samples. LSN will exacerbate people's tendency to rely on smaller samples. In dynamic settings, LSN will make it more likely for an agent to stop acquiring information after just a few signals-but, if the initial evidence does not cause the agent to stop, the agent will still draw inferences based on sample proportions and may get caught in a learning trap.
Our model of NBLLN is defined only when the signals are i.i.d. and binomial. There are some natural approaches to modeling NBLLN for non-i.i.d. signal sequences. Consider a binomial random process defined by a mapping from any initial rate, θ 0 , and any history of t observed signals, h t , into a rate that the (t + 1) st signal will be an a-signal, θ (θ 0 , h t ). When Barney knows the initial rate is θ 0 , he forms his beliefs as if the initial rate were β, a random variable drawn from distribution f ψ ß|Θ (β|θ 0 ). For the first signal in a group, he believes that the probability of an a-signal is β, and for the (t + 1) th signal within that group, he believes that the probability of an a-signal is θ (β, h t ). This modeling approach can be applied not only when the signals truly are non-i.i.d., but also when an agent falsely believes they are non-i.i.d. due to another psychological bias (as in LSN; see Appendix A).
There are also natural extensions of our modeling approach to non-binomial cases. Suppose, for example, that the signals are normally distributed i.i.d. with known mean µ and variance σ 2 . We can imagine a cousin of Barney believes instead that signals are generated by a two-stage process, where a subjective mean ν is drawn from some distribution centered at µ, and then the signals are drawn from a normal distribution with mean ν and variance σ 2 . While Tommy believes that the mean of a large random sample of signals will converge to a point mass at µ, Barney's cousin believes it will converge to the density of ν. We could assume that the density of ν corresponds to
